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Making Motions: The Embodiment of Law in Gesture
BernardJ. Hibbitts*
The Introduction to this collection of essays likens the trajectory of
human experience to driving on the highway. Driving, as an activity is
constricted (or,perhaps more accurately constructed) by a variety of
"texts " which not only help us get where we want to go, but protect us
along the way. For lawyers, the most obvious of these texts is the Motor
Vehicle Code, the written set of driving regulationsformally approvedand
enforced by the State. Drivers, however, are very much aware that the
text of the Motor Vehicle Code is not the only "text" of the road. As the
Introduction points out, "text" is also to be found in highway markers,
dividing lines, road signs and (most importantfor presentpurposes) the
didacticbodily movements and gestures ofpersons we encounteralong the
way, be they state troopers or other drivers.
What is true of driving is in many ways true of law in general. It is
easy to recognize the written text of law, but afully-accurateand nuanced
understandingof how the law actually works requires an appreciationof
other texts in law semiotic field. In this article the author focuses on
one such "alternative" text, legal gesture, by which he means any
purposive bodily motion (especially but not exclusively of the arms or
hands) that by convention signifies a specific legal change, condition or
relation. The body of the articlegroups the functions of legalgesture into
eight distinguishable, but necessarily overlapping categories labeled
"indicative," "ordinative," "evidentiary" "demonstrative," "communal, "
"mnemonic," "regulatory," and "psychological." With each category the
author reviews various specific functions which legal gesture has
historicallyserved and/or continues to serve in our own legal system. The
author concludes by suggesting that far from being a primitive or naive
modality inherently inferior to writing, legalgesture is a sophisticatedand
powerful medium possessing a unique capacity to foster community
concretenessand bodily empowerment. To the extent that these ends and
values are deemed worthy in a postmodern era, it may be appropriateto
reform law by literally re-memberingit.

* Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
Author's Note: I would like to thank Jody Armour, Harry Flechtner, Charles Goodwin, and Adam
Kendon for their thoughtful comments on a previous draft of this paper. I similarly appreciate the
research assistance of Leah Schmulewitz and William Curley. Responsibility for any mistakes or errors
of interpretation contained herein is, of course, entirely my own.
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I.

THE BODY IN LAW'S TEXT

In contemporary America, the locus of legal meaning - law's "text,"
if you will - is habitually deemed to be the written word. To guarantee
"a government of laws and not of men," Americans have vested ultimate
legal authority in a written Constitution bolstered by innumerable volumes
of printed precedents and statutes. To prevent fraud and promote
certainty, American lawyers routinely recommend (and our legislatures
often insist) that basic legal transactions such as wills, contracts, and
conveyances be put in writing. Traditional legal doctrine demands that our
courts construe legal instruments solely according to their written terms,
disregarding any oral statements made by the parties before those written
terms were set down (the "parol evidence" rule). Our law schools teach
law students how to interpret legal literature and how to craft legal
documents.'
The very language of American law is replete with
references to the written word that underline the latter's denotive
fundamentality Standard law is "black-letter" Careful or circumspect
judges follow "the letter of the law." Law-enforcement officers may
"throw the book" at a repeat offender. Every layman knows that the
essence of any legal agreement is to be found in the "fine print."
We must acknowledge the central and constructive role of writing in
law's contemporary text, but we must not give in to the literal limitations
of that metaphor. In particular; we must not overlook unwritten forms of
expression and experience that shape our understanding and appreciation
of law in practice, if rarely in principle. Even in a society saturated by the
written word, law lives in the speech of lawyers and clients, in the
gestures of attorneys and witnesses, and in the multi-sensory "performances" of persons party to wills, marriages, and trials. It resides in the setting
and structure of courthouses, the design and decoration of courtrooms, and
the costume and accoutrements ofjudges. Notwithstanding our traditional
inclination to ignore them, these and other "alternative" legal texts have
always had presence and power. Today a number of legal scholars are
taking them more seriously, thanks in part to new audio and video

1. A Canadian legal scholar, working within a pedagogically-similar environment, has gone so far
as to describe contemporary legal education as a form of "literacy training." DeCoste, 1990: 61. See
also Lepow, 1992: 78 ("Lawyers see the world as what can be written down in documents.").
2. On spoken language in various legal settings, see, e.g., Conley et a., 1990; Ainsworth, 1993;
Sarat etal., 1989; Gill, 1988. On contemporary legal performances, see, e.g., Ball, 1975: 81; Beyer,
1988. On the significance of gesture and body language in courtroom communication, see Barkai, 1990.
On the role of architecture in shaping legal meaning, see Goodrich, 1988: 148-151; Jones, 1991. On
the growing legal significance of audio-video "paratexts," see Collins et al., 1992.
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technologies which have allowed alternative forms to be preserved and
studied with unprecedented ease.'
Here, then, is an incipient "crisis of text" within American law - a
growing appreciation that the traditional equation of legal text with writing
is inadequate. What is at stake in this crisis, however, is more than just
an equation. The disjuncture between narrow and broad conceptions of
legal text complements and potentially incorporates many other basic
discontinuities. Writing, for instance, has frequently been associated with
(among other things) "reason," the "masculine," and elite power. On the
other hand, non-written forms have frequently (and rather more pejoratively) been associated with emotion, the "feminine," and the masses. In this
context, resolving the law's crisis of text in favor of writing alone, or
alternatively in favor of a multiplicity of forms that includes but is hardly
limited to writing, promises to have profound philosophical, sociological,
and political implications. 5
In this Article, I would like to push our conception of law's text beyond
its traditional inscripted bounds by focusing on gesture as a legal
instrumentality - or, somewhat more succinctly, "legal gesture." By this
I mean any purposive bodily motion (especially, but not exclusively, of the
arms or hands) that by convention signifies a specific legal change,
condition, or relation.6 An example of a contemporary legal gesture is
raising one's right hand close to the body to signify the taking of an oath;
an historical example, drawn from medieval Europe, is passing a straw,
twig, or clod of earth to another person to signify the conveyance of
land.7 My definition of legal gesture purposefully excludes from the
3. See, e.g., Birdwhistell, 1970: 50, ("[T]he movie camera, together with the slow-motion analyzer,
makes possible observation and analysis of human social behavior which has hitherto been hidden from
comparative analysis.").
4. On the cultural significance and psychological and social implications of written and non-written
forms, see generally Goody, 1986; Olson, 1994; Ong, 1982.
5. On the implications of various communicative forms (and combinations of those forms) for
understandings of law, see Collins et al., 1992; Hibbitts, 1992; Hibbitts, 1995; Katsh, 1989.
6. This definition is extrapolated from Adam Kendon's definition of "gesture" in general: "any
distinct bodily action that is regarded as being directly involved in the process of deliberate utterance."
Kendon, 1990: 53. Extrapolating from the general to the legal here is especially appropriate insofar as
many legal gestures are particularized or elaborated forms of gestures used in extra-legal contexts
(although it is frequently unclear whether general gestures have shaped legal ones or vice versa).
7. Some scholars prefer to label at least some legal gestures "legal acts." For instance, it has been
suggested that the term "gesture" is inadequate as a descriptor of potentially complicated legal
procedures that involve multiple physical movements and even multiple actors. See, e.g., Viberg,
1992:9. It has also been suggested that certain legal gestures (such as transferring the straw or twig
referred to above) are "acts" because they have efficacious physical results. There is something to both
of these points. I nonetheless intend to eschew the term "legal act" in this Article. In the first place,
that term does not suggest corporeal physicality as unequivocally as does "legal gesture." In the second
place, the physical efficaciousness of movements need not defeat their status as gestures so long as they
retain symbolic significance beyond their physical outcomes; in other words, passing a straw or twig
to another person may validly be considered a gesture insofar as it has an importance (which, as
representing the conveyance of a larger property, it does) beyond the literal physical transfer of the
object. In the third place, regarding gesture as necessarily "monologic" (i.e., performed by one party
only) rather than potentially "dialogic" (i.e., performed by multiple parties interacting) is problematic.
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scope of this paper the many ordinary gestures used by lawyers and other
legal actors to express emotion or emphasis, but which lack an explicitly
legal import.' Their study - however interesting and relevant to an
understanding of legal process - may be left for another occasion.
I have several reasons for focusing on legal gesture above all other
alternative texts of law. First among these is the stark and provocative
phenomenological contrast that gesture presents to writing (considering the
latter as an artifact, not an activity which itself might be characterized as
gestural). Unlike writing, which derives most of its status, strength, and
utility from being largely disembodied, gesture is inevitably and intimately
embodied. In this capacity it is personal where writing tends to be
impersonal, social where writing tends to be private, contextual where
writing tends to be decontextual, ephemeral where writing tends to be
permanent, and dynamic where writing tends to be static. These and other
differences promise to make the study of legal gesture especially liberating
for members of a writing-oriented legal culture.
My second reason for focusing on legal gesture has to do with the long
(if still under-appreciated) history of that form in Western jurisprudence.
Mirroring the changing fortunes of gesture in Western culture,9 legal
gesture has been an integral part of the Western legal tradition for more
than 5000 years. In Mesopotamian and early Mediterranean societies that
had little or no experience with writing, gesture was a critical element in
legal performances marking legal change and relation. ° The extent of
law's dependence on gesture seems to have declined in the increasingly
literate environments of Hellenistic Greece and Imperial Rome," but the
form and its legal manifestations experienced a resurgence in the "Dark
Ages" that followed the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. 2 Legal
gesture went into abeyance again after the twelfth century "Revival of
Learning,"' 3 but its decline was gradual at first, becoming precipitous albeit never terminal - only in the wake of the Protestant Reformation
(with its Scripturally-animated aversion to image and ceremony), 4 the
development of Cartesian philosophy (with its denigration of the body in
favor of the mind)," and the spread of literacy through the mass of
Not only is it arbitrary (reflecting, perhaps, a contemporary Western emphasis in the individual as the
appropriate unit of analysis), but arguably unhelpful in evaluating how gesture in general (and legal
gesture in particular) actually works in society.
8. See generally Barka, 1990; Craver, 1993.
9. On these changing fortunes, see generally Bremmer etal., 1991; Elias, 1978.
10. See generally Hibbitts, 1992; Malul, 1983; Sial, 1890.
11. See, e.g., Meyer, 1988.
12. See generally Hibbitts, 1992; Huebner, 1918; Koziol, 1992; Le Goff, 1980; Levy, 1951; Schmitt,
1990; Tabuteau, 1988.
13. See, e.g., Major, 1987.
14. See generally Eire, 1986. One sixteenth century Protestant commentator characteristically
observed: "Some foolishly imagine that praier is made either better or worse by the jesture of our
bodyes." Quoted in Thomas, 1991: 6.
15. See generally Descartes, 1992 (Heffernan trans.).

[VOL. 6:51

Making Motions

European and American populations16 (thanks largely to the development
of the printing press). 7 Notwithstanding this relatively recent setback,
the indisputedly lengthy and elaborate career of legal gesture in use makes
it a prime candidate for extended examination.
My third and final reason for focusing on legal gesture has to do with
the likelihood that in an age of video and computers, gesture in general
will become a more prominent and more respected communicative form.
The visual media of film and television have already laid the cultural
groundwork for gesture's revival.' 8 Challenging our Cartesian prejudices,
Harvard psychologist Howard Gardner (1983: 205) has recently posited the
existence of a "bodily-kinesthetic intelligence" of which gesture is but one
manifestation. 9 Other psychologists have lately suggested that a growing
number of American children use a so-called "McLanguage" which relies
much more on gesture than does traditional English.2 0 At the same time,
many computer software and hardware designers are working on "gestural
interfaces" (extending all the way to "virtual reality") that will eventually
revolutionize the way we interact with both electronic machines and each
other.2 As a new generation more comfortable with gesture grows up
and enters professional life, and as visual and computer technologies
continue to progress and shape cultural experience and expectations, we
may plausibly expect renewed interest in gesture as a legal instrumentality.
Studying legal gesture now may help us to both understand and deal with
the possible consequences of such a development.
The few studies of legal gesture that have been undertaken to this point
have explored its prominence in various legal systems and cultural
environments,22 the significance of specific legal gestures in specific
historic contexts,23 and the depiction of legal gestures in particular

16.

See generally Gilmore, 1989; Houston, 1988.

17. In practice, many legal gestures were demeaned and ridiculed before they were formally
eliminated. In 1739, for instance, David Hume wrote: "In order to aid the imagination in conceiving
the transference of property, we take the sensible object [e.g., a clod of earth] and actually transfer to
the person, on whom we would bestow the property. The suppos'd resemblance of the actions, and the
presence of this sensible delivery, deceive the mind, and make it fancy, that it conceives the mysterious
This is a kind of superstitious practice in civil laws, and in the laws of
transition of the property ....
nature, resembling the Roman catholic superstitions in religion. . . ." Hume, 1888: 515.
18. See Carpenter, 1960: 170 ("[F]ilm and TV are aiding us in the recovery of gesture ..
Featherstone, 1990:179 ("[T]he new emphasis upon visual images [draws] attention to the appearance
of the body, the clothing, demeanour and gesture.").
19. See also Berman, 1989: 109 (discussing "body literacy"); Damasio, 1994: xvi.
20. Healy, 1990: 102; see also Pittman, 1990. In this context it is interesting to note that posters
promoting a current national campaign against youth violence feature not only the slogan "Squash it,"
but an accompanying gesture of a fist restrained by a cupped hand. Koman, 1994. See also Thomas,

1991: 9 ("The middle-class youth of western Europe and America have no apparent inhibitions about
... gesticulating ... or expressing their emotions in physical form.").
21. See generally Kurtenbach et al., 1990; Laurel, 1993: 155-158; Romanyshyn, 1994 (discussing
the "gestural metaphysics" of cyberspace).
22. See, e.g., Chasson, 1847; Hibbitts, 1992; Kocher, 1992; Koziol, 1992; Malul, 1983; Viberg,
1992.
23. See, e.g., Major, 1987; Malul, 1987; Wright, 1986.
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manuscripts or other specific physical settings.24 To this point, however,
no one has considered the general functions of legal gesture as a
modality.25 Granted, legal gesture has been and to some extent still is
used to swear oaths, transfer land, make contracts, and accomplish other
specific legal ends, but what general functions does it serve within legal
systems? What does it do? Our erstwhile failure to ask these rather basic
questions has, I suggest, led us to underestimate legal gesture's inherent
power and potential (an underestimation revealed by our tendency to
pre-emptively dismiss legal gesture as "primitive," "archaic," or "naive").
In an effort to remedy this situation, Section II of this Article outlines
eight broad categories of function which legal gesture has historically
served and, on occasion, still serves; it then describes specific functions
that specific legal gestures serve or have served within each of those
categories. Section III of this Article suggests how an appreciation of
legal gesture's multiple capabilities can provide important new insights
into gesture's survival on the margins of contemporary legal culture, into
its checkered history, and even into its future as a legal instrumentality.
II.

THE FuNcTIoNs OF LEGAL GESTURE

The many functions of legal gesture as a modality can be grouped into
at least eight distinguishable but necessarily overlapping categories.
Somewhat arbitrarily, I have labelled these categories "indicative,"
"ordinative," "evidentiary" "demonstrative," "communal," "mnemonic,"
"regulatory," and "psychological. 26 In this Section, I will consider these
categories in turn, illustrating the multiple specific functions legal gesture
can serve within each category by reference to individual legal gestures
drawn from historical27 or contemporary experience.28 Given the many

24. Amira, 1902-26; Kocher, 1981; Letts, 1933; Melnikas, 1975.
25. The closest legal scholars have come to this has been examining the functions of "legal
formalities." This literature is certainly helpful to the present investigation, but it is neither very
nuanced nor altogether applicable (given especially that legal gesture is merely one formality among
others).
26. This ordering is not meant to imply any priority among functional categories other than a rough
progression from what I (again, somewhat arbitrarily) would consider more- to less-obvious. I should
emphasize that just as legal gesture is related to gesture in general (see Kendon, 1990), these categories
may be applicable to the use of gesture in extra-legal settings.
27. Referring to "historical" legal gestures inevitably presents a problem of evidence. Most of our
knowledge of the legal gestures used in defunct societies is based on surviving iconographic records
comprised of reliefs, paintings, and illuminated manuscripts. All these sources are problematic. In the
first place, art in these forms "arrests movement and is therefore restricted in the gestures it can show
unambiguously" (Gombrich, 1982: 68). One must also acknowledge the possibility that not all the legal
gestures depicted in historical iconographic sources were actually used, some having been, perhaps,
attempts on the part of artists to create a visual equivalent for unheard speech. At the same time, it is
also
possible that some gestures initially born of artistic convention eventually worked their way into
legal practice.
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gaps in the existing legal and psychological literatures on gesture, much
of what I have to say here is necessarily impressionistic; I offer it as a
starting-point for more research rather than as a definitive product.
A.

Indicative Functions

Legal gesture can perform a variety of "indicative" functions, i.e.,
functions by which (implicitly or explicitly) it indicates or identifies
certain important aspects or elements of legal transactions.
Most basically, legal gesture is a physical and corporeal sin which can
indicate that a legal change or relation is being effected. 29 Although
admittedly ambiguous in isolation, its use in appropriate settings can
resolve potential doubts about the legal meaning or enforceability of words
or other actions. In contemporary courtrooms, for instance, raising one's
right hand close to the body usually indicates that a binding oath is being
sworn. In the Middle Ages, pointing one's index and middle fingers (as
depicted on the eleventh century Bayeux Tapestry and the fourteenth
century manuscripts of the German Sachsenspiegel) could similarly
indicate an oath-swearing. Such legal gestures have historically served as
a sort of semiotic shorthand, alerting people not only to the fact that
something of legal consequence is happening, but also to the precise legal
nature of that "something" (e.g., the swearing of an oath).3"
More concretely, legal gesture can indicate the party or parties to a legal
transaction. Consider, oath-taking again. In ancient Greece and Rome, an
individual could physically identify himself as an oath-swearer by placing
In our own society, oath-swearers
his hand on the altar of a god.
identify themselves to others by, inter alia, placing one hand on a Bible
and raising the other. Analogously, gestures can indicate the parties to
bilateral or multilateral undertakings, contracts, or conveyances. For

28. Two points might be made here in passing. First, individual legal gestures do not necessarily
fall into all of the functional categories embraced by legal gesture as a whole, nor do they necessarily
perform all possible functions within any category they do fall into. Second, identification of any

specific function of legal gesture is not meant to imply that that function is necessarily exclusive to
gesture (as opposed to say speech, or writing) as a legal instrumentality.
29.

In the general literature on legal formalities, this tends to be described as an "evidentiary"

function. In this Article, however, I will be using the term "evidentiary" more specifically to describe
those functions of legal gesture related to the showing of intent and feeling.
30. Here a general comment of the nineteenth century German jurist Rudolph von Thering is
especially illuminative:
Form is for a legal transaction what the stamp is for a coin. Just as the stamp of the coin
relieves us from the necessity of testing the metallic content and weight - in short, the value of
the coin .. , in the same way legal formalities relieve the judge of an inquiry whether a legal
transaction was intended and - in case different forms are fixed for different legal transactions
- which was intended.
Quoted in Fuller, 1941: 801.
31.
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instance, in the ancient Roman marriage ceremony, the parties oining their
In early
right hands (dextrarum junctio) were bride and groom.
medieval Europe, the gestures of handing over and receiving a clod of
earth marked parties as the grantor and grantee of land respectively
visibly distinguishing them from other persons present as witnesses or
simple bystanders. Medieval legal gestures sometimes worked in the same
indicative fashion when multiple parties surrendered rights to one party,
or when one person transferred rights to multiple parties. Thus, in
eleventh century Normandy, a husband, wife, and their two sons made a
gift to a local church: a surviving charter records that "all equally in
confirmation of the aforesaid gift, together holding
33 one book [standing for
the gift], placed [it] on the altar of St. Martin.
Legal gesture can also indicate the witnesses guaranteeing a legal
transaction or event. This indication of witnesses is often accomplished
directly by gestures performed by the witnesses themselves. For example,
according to the Book of Leviticus, the witnesses to a death sentence in
ancient Hebrew culture were required to come up and place their hands on
the head of the condemned individual. This act directly marked them as
witnesses simultaneously seeing, hearing, and endorsing the condemnation. 34 Similarly, several early Anglo-Saxon land charters contain a
formula usually mistranslated as "the witnesses and their signatures are
recorded," but which actually means "the witnesses were sworn and their
hands touched."',3 This formula suggests that after watching the gestures
performed by the participants to a conveyance, the witnesses endorsed the
conveyance by touching the charter recording it. In both these contexts,
the witnesses arguably came into being qua witnesses as much (if not
more) by the gestures they performed as by any declaration or writing
down of names.
Less directly, legal gesture can indicate the witnesses to an action by
unilateral motions which designate witnesses metaphorically In ancient
Israel, for instance, swearing with one's hand on the thigh or genitals
appears to have been an invocation of ancestors to witness and, if

32. See generally Davies, 1985; Williams, 1958. A similar gesture is recorded in the Bible (Tobit
7:13) and later became a prominent feature of medieval matrimonial practice. Still figuring in
contemporary Christian liturgy (see, e.g., the matrimonial directions of the 1977 Episcopalian Prayer
Book), it may have encouraged the English expression "to ask for [her] hand in marriage" (although
both the expression and the gesture seem ultimately to have been derived from the Roman concept of
manus, whereby a woman was under the control of - literally, "in the hands of' - her father or
husband). Boswell, 1994: 213.
33. Tabuteau, 1988: 120-121.
34. Leviticus 24:14. See generally Wright, 1986: 434-35 ("By [their gesture] the witnesses

symbolically confirm their testimony to the community and also acknowledge their responsibility in the
death of the criminal.").
35.

Danet et al., 1992: 103. See also sec. 1.1 of the medieval Bavarian Laws: "If any free person

wishes to give his property to a church... let him confirm this bestowal with his own hand through
a charter [letter], and let him call six or more witnesses if he wishes. Let them place their hands on the
letter, and let those whom he asks mark their names there." Rivers trans., 1977: 118.
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necessary to defend the oath. 6 In ancient Greece and Rome, the
aforementioned gesture of placing one's hand on an altar indicated not
only the party taking the oath, but also that one or more gods was being
called on to witness it." Even today, the raising of the right hand is a
sort of calling on our own God as witness, towards whom one's hand is
extended in indication and supplication."
Finally, legal gesture can literally or metaphorically indicate the object
of a legal transaction. Frequently, this object is another person. Thus, the
aforementioned Hebrew witnesses' gesture of touching the head of a man
marked him as the object of the condemnation. More positively, ancient
Hebrew law gave testators an opportunity to gesturally designate their
beneficiaries: the Book of Genesis records that Israel, the father of Joseph,
designated Joseph's son Ephraim as his principal beneficiary by putting his
right hand on Ephraim's head.39 In Roman law, a party claiming a slave
analogously indicated him as the object of his claim by touching the slave
with a ceremonial rod, saying: "I claim this man is mine by Quiritary right
according to his pro per title. As I have declared, so, look you, I have laid
my staff on him." 4 Alternatively, a legal gesture can indicate what, if
not who, is the focus of legal activity.4 In medieval conveyances, for
instance, the gesture of transferring a straw or a clod of earth generally
indicated that land was the object of transfer."
In thirteenth century
England, a transfer "by the door and its hasp and key" similarly signified
livery of seisin of a house.43 More abstractly, the medieval practice of
handing over a staff or a glove often indicated a transfer of power (e.g.,
to do violence) or a right (e.g., to hold land or some other thing) as
specified by accompanying words."

36.
37.
38.
39.

Malul, 1985: 198.
Bauml et al., 1975: 152.
Viberg, 1992: 24.
Genesis 48:15. Joseph, realizing what his father had done, objected: "And Joseph said to his

father, 'Not so, my father, for this one is the first-born [i.e., more entitled]; put your right
hand upon
his head."' Genesis 48:19. Compare Israel's gesture with that reported by the plaintiff in a
Mesopotamian Nuzi lawsuit: "My father Huya was ill and he lay on (his) bed. And my father took my
hand, and spoke to me thus: 'My other, older sons have taken wives, but you have not taken a wife.

Therefore I am giving you Sulili-Ishtar as your wife."' Quoted in Speiser, 1955: 252.
40. Gaius, 1946: 237 (de Zuleta trans.).
41. In the Middle Ages, however, not all gestures literally indicted their material or legal (as
opposed to their human) objects. Thus in eleventh century Normandy, many legal gestures made on
the occasion of gifts to churches employed books which had no clear relationship to the object of gift.
Tabuteau, 1988: 127-28.

42. The objects by themselves marked nothing unless and until gestures were made. To the extent
that the objects were physically preserved afterwards, they were supposed to prompt recollection of the
gestures which had given them meaning in the first place. Thus, an English chronicler writing circa
1100 noted that a cup given to Durham Cathedral on the occasion of a gift of land "is preserved in the
church and retains the memory of that deed forever." Clanchy, 1979: 24 (quoting Simon of Durham,
Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia). See also Fichtenau, 1991: 32.
43. Bracton, 1977: 125 (Thome trans.).
44. Le Goff, 1980: 245.
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B.

Odinative Functions

Legal gesture has what might be termed "ordinative" functions insofar
as it can order and organize both the deployment and the perception of
legal meaning.
First of all, legal gesture can "highlight" important information, events,
or relationships within a legal transaction or performance. 5 Highlighting
frequently follows from indication. Highlighting nonetheless goes beyond
indication by setting legal gesture in the context of legal performance as
a whole; it focuses on how legal gesture's deployment emphasizes some
aspects of a transaction and not others. In a conveyance, for instance, a
legal gesture may not only indicate who is giving and receiving land, but
may draw special attention to those facts. As a result of gestures, the
identity of the parties is foregrounded vis-a-vis other (theoretically less
important) aspects of the agreement (such as the duration of the estate
created) which may be solely expressed in speech.
Second, legal gesture can frame or define a legal transaction by marking
its beginning and end. It thereby divides legally-important words and
behaviors from other words and behaviors, giving a physical focus to
witnesses' attention and later recollection.' Homer described a framing
use of legal gesture in the Iliad: at one point during the siege of Troy, the
Greek warrior Achilles initiated an oath by grasping the staff that gave
him power to speak before the assembled Greeks; at the end of his oath,
he flung the staff on the ground.47 Somewhat less dramatically we
frame our own oaths by raising and then lowering our right hands.
Third, legal gesture can punctuate a legal performance by dividing it
into individual "bits" or "chunks" of legal information. Such punctuation
makes legal information easier to understand by providing multiple
moments within which words or other transactional developments may be
simultaneously assimilated and anticipated. The relatively long and
complicated medieval homage ceremony was thus punctuated by several
gestures: the vassal knelt and folded his hands, the lord embraced the
hands of the vassal, and the lord kissed the vassal." Metaphorically and
even literally in this context, legal gestures allowed participants and
witnesses to catch their breath. Such gestures were effective as punctua-

45. "Highlighting" has recently been defined as making "specific phenomena in a complex
perceptual field salient by marking them in some fashion." Goodwin, 1994: 606.
46. Tiersma, 1988: 3 (describing this in terms of a separation between the ordinary and the
extraordinary).
47.

Iliad: 1.233-36, 245.

48. See Le Goff, 1980: 239 (quoting Guillaume Durand's Speculum Juris(1271): "[Hie who does
homage, on his knees, places his hands between the hands of his lord and does him homage; he
promises on his honor, and the lord, in a reciprocal sign of faith gives him a kiss.").
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tion because they were deployed neither too frequently nor too infrequently. Performed too frequently, they themselves would have overloaded the
attention and memory of witnesses; performed not frequently enough, they
would have lost most of their prosodic value. In the context of a large
ceremony, punctuating legal gestures can also give participants important
physical cues for the ceremony's further gestural and verbal elaboration.49
In this respect, legal gestures are stimulants to thought which help to
ensure that legal change is effected according to conventional norms.
C. EvidentiaryFunctions
Legal gesture can serve two functions which may conveniently be
described as "evidentiary" insofar as they evince key aspects of a
gesturor's mental state.
To begin, legal gesture can evince "intent": the intellectual willingness
to initiate or undertake a legal change or relation. Legal gesture interposes
between legal statement and legal consequence a physical action that
requires time, effort, and voluntariness. The prospective or actual
expenditure of time and effort focuses attention on the legal commitment
being undertaken and gives individuals further opportunity or occasion to
reflect on its probable results;50 the performance of a calculated legal
gesture after the passage of time when words are spoken (or through a
period of time during which words are spoken) suggests that a gesturor
genuinely wishes to accomplish a conveyance, a sale, etc.5 By the same
token, of course, the prospect or the obligation of having to make a timeand effort-consuming legal gesture may restrain individuals from making
commitments which are in fact unintended.52 The status of legal gesture
as a voluntary physical movement also makes legal gesture evidentiary of
intent because it reduces (although it admittedly does not eliminate) the
possibility that the gesturor is acting under some kind of external duress.
In the context of these observations it is quite clear why in the Middle

49. Feyereisen et al., 1991: 85 ("[M]otor performance during the presentation of verbal material
may enhance recall performance."). See also McNeil, 1992:245 ("Gestures occur.., because they are
part of the speaker's ongoing thought process. Without them thought would be altered or incomplete.").
50. Here legal gesture might be said to serve a mental "channeling" function (not to be confused,
however, with the regulatory "channeling" function).
51. Livy's description of a legal gesture supposedly performed by the Carthaginian general Hannibal
in association with an offer to liberate all the slaves who had accompanied their masters on service in
Italy with the Carthaginian army in the third century B.C.: "To prove the genuineness of these offers,
taking a lamb in his left hand and a stone in his right, he prayed to Jupiter and the other gods that if
he broke his word, they would serve him as he was about to serve the lamb -

whereupon he crushed

the animal's head with the stone. The gesture succeeded .. " Livy, 1965: 71 (de Selincourt trans.).
52. To this extent legal gesture, like other legal formalities, has a "cautionary" aspect. See also
infra, "Regulatory Functions."
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Ages - consistent with then-prevailing theories of gesture in general 3
- gestures of homage were deemed to evince intent to be bound to one's
feudal lord. They were time-consuming, effort-consuming, and demanded
voluntary action on the part of the prospective vassal.54
Second, legal gesture can evince feeling, i.e., the emotions which
accompany or are occasioned by a legal change or relation. 5 Legal
transactions are "liminal" events - events that involve transitions from
one social state or condition to another.56 A person is independent, and
then is dependent (vassalage); a person is separate, and then one is
connected (contract; marriage); one is a possessor, and then one is not
(conveyance). Liminal events are frequently occasions for the experience
of strong emotions. If an individual is not able to physically show those
emotions through, say, the making of a gesture, he may feel disconnected
or vaguely disassociated from legal change. It may not be fully real to
him or to others and therefore, perhaps, not fully compelling. On the
other hand, performing a gesture may provide a legal actor with a critical
catharsis, an opportunity to release and display emotions attendant upon
change or relation in a way that consolidates that change and relation and
supports its working. Returning to the example of the medieval homage
ceremony, the gestures of kneeling and folding one's hands provided the
gesturor not only with an opportunity to evince conscious intent to become
the lord's man, but also an opportunity to show before his lord and others
the humility with which he took up his new status. This display of
humility in turn became a personal and social resource which helped
sustain the feudal relationship into the future.
D. DemonstrativeFunctions
Legal gesture can perform at least two "demonstrative" functions.
These differ from indicative functions insofar as they involve analogic or
symbolic showings or depictions of legal change or relation, and not
merely significations of specific elements or aspects; 7 they differ from

53. See, for instance, Peter the Chanter's statement: "The gesture of the body is an argument and
proof of the devotion of the mind." Quoted in Koziol, 1992: 60.
54. The capacity of this and other gestures for evidencing intent was in fact deemed so great that
early medieval law frequently collapsed intent into action, assuming the former from the latter (a
tendency which some scholars have mistaken for a medieval disregard of intent). See generally Mueller,
1955; Rosen,. 1985: 52; Sayre, 1932. ,
55. The emotional capacity of gesture in general has been recognized for a long time. In the early
Middle Ages, the Carolingian scholar Alcuin observed that by kneeling for worship Christians "show
forth our humbleness of heart." Quoted in "Genuflexion" in 6 Catholic Encyclopedia, 1908: 423.
56. On liminality generally, see Gennep, 1960.
57. See Kendon, 1985: 226 ("Gesture ... comes in handy because being the kind of expressive
medium that it is, it allows for the possibility of representing aspects of experience that can be
represented in words at best only indirectly and in some respects not at all. It is impossible to display
the appearance of action except by some form of action, for example. The representation of spatial
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evidentiary functions insofar as they display "objective" rather than
"subjective" dimensions of legal transactions. In execution, each
demonstrative function of legal gesture can clarify the meaning and
significance of legal information provided by other modalities (speech and
even, theoretically, writing).58 Collectively, the demonstrative capacities
of legal gesture make it easier for gesturors and witnesses alike to
understand the effect or implications of legal transactions. Such understanding may propel legal change by confirming individuals in their
consent or their choices, or may alternatively prevent it by prospectively
presenting individuals with an image depicting the otherwise undesired
legal or physical effects of an inclination or declaration.
First, legal gesture can physically demonstrate the nature or effect of a
legal agreement or relation. In ancient Mesopotamian law, for instance,
a debtor's gesture of handing his garment (or the hem of his garment) to
a creditor as part of a loan agreement demonstrated that the debtor represented by the garment which had literally assumed his shape when
worn - was coming under the creditor's legal and even physical
power.59 This demonstration may have been accompanied by a verbal
explanation of what was going on, but the gestures (perhaps intentionally
see infra, "Mnemonic Functions") made the speech somewhat
redundant. In the same legal culture, washing one's hands in an
appropriate physical and verbal context demonstrated a giving u (a
"cleansing" or literal "dissolving") of one's contractual obligations.' In
ancient Greece, throwing iron bars into the sea after taking an oath (e.g.,
of alliance) demonstrated that the oath could not be revoked (insofar as the
bars could not be retrieved).6 In Imperial Rome, the joining of right
hands demonstrated the achievement of peace and harmony between bride
and groom.62 In the Middle Ages, the prospective vassal's placement of
his hands together before his lord ("commendation") in the conventional
medieval homage ceremony demonstrated that he was legally bound, or

arrangements cannot be accomplished directly in words, but by moving the hands of the body about in

space it is possible to demonstrate them.").
58. On the clarificatory capacity ofgesture generally, see Kellerman, 1992:241. One study reported
by Kellerman involved subjects guessing an object from descriptions communicated by: (1) sound alone;
(2) sound and facial expressions; and (3) sound and physiographic gestures denoting size, shape or

movement. The subjects performed best under the third set of conditions, in which gestures had been
used.
59.

Viberg, 1992: 134. Compare the Hittite Laws, in which the severing of ties between parent and

child involved a mother removing her son's robe, demonstrating the withdrawal of familial protection.
Kruger, 1988: 113.

60. Kilmer, 1974: 180-82. This gesture resonates with the well-known gesture of Pontius Pilate,
the first century Roman governor ofJudea, demonstrating his renunciation of responsibility for the death
of Jesus. See Matthew 27:24: "Pilate ... took water and washed his hands before the crowd saying,
'I am innocent of this man's blood; see to it yourselves.'"
61.
62.

1995]

Steiner, 1994: 68.
Boswell, 1994: 51.
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was at least ready to be bound.63 The lord's placement of his hands over
the hands of the vassal in turn demonstrated the lord's assumption of
dominance within the feudal relationship being created between them. The
same reality was gesturally demonstrated in German feudal law by having
the lord step on the vassal's foot.'
Second, legal gesture can demonstrate the sanction supporting a legal
transaction or relation - the price to be paid if a contract is not upheld
or a conveyance is not accepted. This in terrorem function of legal
gesture seems to have been particularly popular in ancient law. Homer's
Iliad suggests that in ancient Greece, a mutual oath could be concluded by
two parties taking wine from bowls and pouring it out on the ground. In
the epic itself, the acts were accompanied by the explicatory words,
"Whichever of the two [sides] should first do harm against the oaths, may
their brains be poured onto the ground just as this wine."65 The Roman
historian Livy likewise reports that a Roman official concluded an early
treaty between the Romans and the Albans with these words: "If [the
Roman people] should by public consent and fraudulently depart from [the
terms of the treaty], then, do you, Jupiter, so strike the Roman people as
I strike this pig this day; strike so much the more as your power and
strength are greater" At this point, according to Livy, the official "struck
the pig with a flint knife."'
Graphically concretizing penalties in this
fashion drove home their meaning, and in the process provided a powerful
incentive for parties to adhere to legal obligations.6 7

63.
64.

Gombrich, 1982: 71.
Bauml et al., 1975:112-113. Compare the ancient Mesopotamian (Nuzi) practice of conveying

land, wherein the seller removed his foot from the land and placed the foot of the buyer in its place,
thereby demonstrating a change in control. Viberg, 1992: 161.
65.
66.

Iliad: 19.299-300.
Quoted in Watson, 1993: 33.

Compare a treaty ceremony between the Romans and

Carthaginians (279 B.C.) described by Polybius: "[T]he oath by Juppiter [sic] Lappis is as follows. The
man who is swearing to the treaty takes in hishand a stone, and when he has sworn in the name of the
state, he says 'If I abide by this my oath may all good be mine, but if I do otherwise in thought or act,
let all other men dwell safe in their own countries under their own laws and in possession of their own
substance, temples and tombs, and may I alone be cast forth, even as this stone', and so saying he
throws the stone from his hand." Ibid. at 44.
67. By this stage in my analysis the careful reader will have noted that while I have acknowledged

the various "indicative," "evidentiary," and "demonstrative" functions of legal gesture, I have stopped
short of suggesting that legal gesture is "performative," i.e., that it can actually accomplish (as opposed
tomerely mark or show) legal change or relation. There is admittedly some evidence to support the
latter proposition. For instance, a medieval French manuscript relates that in the year 981, during the
negotiations between the German emperor Otto II and Hugh Capet of France, Otto intentionally left his
sword on a chair and asked Hugh to pick it up. A French bishop, fearing that Hugh would thereby be

legally transmuted into Otto's swordbearer (i.e. feudal subordinate), snatched it from his hand. Schmitt,
1990: 13. In this context Otto and the bishop obviously believed that the gesture was itself legally
efficacious, even if Hugh did not. Note also the situation described by the republican Roman playwright

Terrence in his comedy Andria, where a young and somewhat besotted male character considers himself
married to an unlikely (indeed, illegal) partner by virtue of the fact that she put her right hand in his

while the two were standing at her mother's deathbed.
My own opinion is that in these and most other historical contexts, true legal efficacy lay not in such
gestures on their own, but rather in the holistic "performances" during which gestures, words and some-
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E. Communal Functions
Legal gesture can perform three functions which may broadly be termed
"communal," i.e., productive of a heightened sense of individual
connection to a community.
Most obviously, legal gesture can promote community by physically
creating community in space. To be at all meaningful, legal gestures
require witnesses to observe them. In societies with little or no experience
with writing, it is important that many people witness legal gestures so that
transactions will be properly and effectively remembered. The more
important the transaction, the greater the number of witnesses that tend to
be required, both by law and practice.68 In the early Middle Ages, legal
gestures were purposefully performed in the crowded market or in the
public court. When people came together to witness gestures in these
settings (as reflected in the oft-repeated documentary formulas "in the eyes
of many" and "in the presence of many"),69 the community was
(re-)created.70
The physical re-creation of community is facilitated by the fact that
legal gesture is interesting and even fun to watch (in other words,
community re-creation is stimulated by community recreation). Legal
gestures generally involve persons performing unusual and even potentially
threatening acts. They therefore tend to bring people together even in
societies which, because of writing, are less dependent on communal
memory. A variety of legal gestures seem to have been at least incidentally designed to attract communal attention to themselves. In ancient Israel,
for instance, a man could confirm a legal agreement by giving his sandal
to another man. A modem commentator has called this "a curious custom,
but at least its unusualness would mean that it attracted attention, and this
probably was its object."'" In medieval German law, the legal gesture of
two parties raising their hands over their heads and pressing their palms
together to indicate agreement would likely have made people stop and

times other media were deployed together in the presence of witnesses. See generally Hibbitts, 1992:
941-954. It would, I think, be incorrect to take the (often culminating) part for the whole, or to
conclude that the necessary was sufficient. The alternative would have opened up too many possibilities
for mistake and abuse not to mention comedy, recalling Terrence. This conclusion is specifically
supported by Viberg in the context of ancient Hebrew oath-ceremonies: "[T]he act, together with the
utterance, is what actually makes the oath function in a legal sense. In other words, the act and the
utterance together accomplish the oath." Viberg, 1992: 24. See also Hillers, 1990: 360 (emphasizing
the performativity of legal "ceremonies" which always included words).

68.

See Carlisse, 1928: 705 (referring to witnesses "varying in number according to the value of

the object whose ownership was conveyed").
69. Le Goff, 1980: 274.

70. Fichtenau, 1991: 31 ("[Alnyone who did not participate remained outside. In this way ceremony
established community.").
71. Morris, 1968: 306.
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look." In our own society, so does raising one's hand to swear an oath,
all the more so because of the thinly-veiled threat of assault it appears to
pose to the interlocutor.
In the process of creating community in space, legal gesture also creates
community in time. As conventionalized forms, legal gestures are
necessarily re-enactments and re-endorsements of the past.73 In the short
term, they remind gesturors and witnesses of previous gestural performances. In the long term, they may remind those persons of some past gesture
or experience that was critical in the history of the community. The bond
with the past is physically reaffirmed, while direction is physically set for
the future.
Saying all this does not necessarily mean that legal gesture reaffirms the
communal past exactly as it was. Especially in societies with little or no
experience with writing (and/or other graphic techniques), legal gestures
can change subtlely over time. In the absence of physically-recorded
standards, such change is largely imperceptible to people within the
gestural environment. As writing and graphic recording become more
common in a society, however, gestural continuity is more explicitly
preserved, and changes or mistakes in the reenactment of legal gesture
become more obvious to everyone. When this occurred in the late Middle
Ages, the result was a harsh and even suffocating formalism that
paradoxically helped to undermine legal gesture more than it helped to
preserve it.74
Finally, legal gesture can produce community in an abstract sense not
specifically related to either time or space. It does this by creating and
mediating a law to which all but a very few members of a community can
easily and immediately relate. Unlike writing, gesturing is something that
virtually everyone does and can do. Gesturing does not take years to
either learn or interpret. It is usual, simple, and comprehensible" to the
point that it even transcends speech (making it an instrument than can
bridge linguistic as well as educational gaps - a capacity that proved
particularly useful in the Middle Ages, when formal law was frequently
articulated in Latin or some other language that the common people could
not understand). When law acquires a gestural dimension through the
raising of a hand, the touching of an object or some other symbolic act,

72.

Huebner, 1918: 495.

73.

See Rappaport, 1992 (speaking in a somewhat broader, but still analogous context: "Toperform

a liturgical order ... is perforce to conform to that order.").
74. See, e.g., Lets, 1933: 561 (associating the careful depiction of numerous gestures in illuminated
manuscripts of the German Sachsenspiegel with "a rigid formalism, which in time became so tyrannical
that it was unsafe to take even the simplest step in procedure without the assistance of skilled

advisers."). Compare the medieval Italian experience: "Italy very early shows atendency toward rigidity
of ritual in the realm of symbolic gesture, since it was quick to employ writing in connection with these
ceremonies, and what is written down is more difficult to change than what is not." Le Goff, 1980:
264.
75. At least to people within a given society, if not always to observers from outside.
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it therefore becomes something that all people can share. By placing
otherwise disparate members of a community on the same corporeal level,
legal gesture gives them a common ground.
E

Mnemonic Functions

Legal gesture can serve several functions which might be described as
"mnemonic," i.e., functions which help to ensure the survival of legal
information in the memory of the community. These functions are
especially critical within (although they are hardly limited to) societies
which have had little or no experience with writing.76
Legal gesture's most important mnemonic function is its provision of
non-verbal sensory inputs which are not only mnemonically powerful in
themselves, but which reinforce the mnemonic impact of verbal information accompanying a legal transaction or relationship. For instance, legal
gesture generally provides participants and witnesses with a dynamic visual
image. Numerous psychological studies have shown that a visual image
is more memorable than a verbal declaration, and that a dynamic visual
image is even more memorable than a static one." In fact, the more
visually-interesting or dynamic the action performed, the more mnemonically successful it tends to be. This was certainly the intuitive understanding of one Roger de Montgomery who, according to a thirteenth century
French document, wanted to impress on witnesses the extent of land he
had just transferred to an abbey: "[H]e threw his son Robert de Balleme,
dressed in a miniver cloak, into the water, in witness and memory that the
domain of the abbott and monks extended up to there.""8 It is difficult
to believe that anyone ever forgot that act. Studies have also shown that
recall tends to improve dramatically when visual media are added to verbal
media.79 In this context, it makes a great deal of sense to have someone
perform a legal gesture over and above pronouncing a legally-significant
formula. Even today, "the sight of a couple standing hand-in-hand at the
altar, being joined and blessed by the priest,.., lasts longer in imagination and memory than the [mere] wording of any ceremony, heard now
and then by the congregants.. . 0

76. "Even in the absence of a charter, memory of a transaction, if not of its exact provisions, could
be preserved by illiterate participants, witnesses and neighbors and even by subsequent generations. For
these people, symbolic actions ... were . . . primary means of maintaining continuity in culture and
social structure." White, 1988: 37.
77. Many of these are reviewed in Jahandarie, 1987.
78. Tabuteau, 1988: 151.

1985: 327 ('[G]estures produce amore elaborate memory trace
and thus result
79. Woodall etal.,
in greater recall of target information than ...no accompanying gestures."). See also Kellerman, 1992:
241-42.
80. Boswell, 1994: 206.
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Of course, for the person making it, legal gesture is also a kinetic,
literally moving experience. 8 The feeling of movement may be memorable in itself, partly because movement demands personal involvement and
attention, and partly because it is physically satisfying and enjoyable. In
this context, performing a legal gesture (such as raising a hand to swear
an oath) enables the memory of the legal change or relation to be inscribed
in the body82 where it is not only retained, but reanimated and reinforced
with every subsequent inscription.83
In the process of movement, many legal gestures involve or culminate
in physical contact with an object or another person. Harnessing tactility
to visual and kinetic action reinforces a legal gesture's mnemonic value by
not only providing an additional hook from which memory can hang, but
by providing a stimulus that is particularly intimate, personal, and
powerful. In the eleventh century, William the Conqueror demonstrated
an appreciation of these things when he somewhat facetiously suggested
that driving a knife into the hand of a grantee (presumably causing
outright pain) would be the most effective way to memorialize the giving
of land.8
In addition to providing non-verbal sensory inputs for participants and
witnesses to legal change and relation, legal gesture can support memory
in other less obvious, perhaps more prosaic ways. For instance, we have
previously seen that gesture can attract community attention to an
important legal event. Attracting attention implicitly supports memory by
ensuring that the record of an event will not be jeopardized by the death
or forgetfulness of a few witnesses (which helps to explain the aforementioned phenomenon of having or mandating more witnesses for especially
critical legal events). Legal gesture can also facilitate remembrance by
what I previously described as its simplicity and comprehensibility. What
is simple and comprehensible - what fits into an easily-recognizable
pattern of behavior or interaction - is more likely to be remembered than
what is complicated and unintelligible. 5 The relative simplicity and
comprehensibility of handing over a clod of earth to represent a transfer

81. On gesture and movement generally, see Birdwhistell, 1970.
82. Sienaert, 1990: 95 ("Memory is the reactivation of gestures previously internalized, shaped,
played in us with the co-operation of our body. And the greater the participation of our body has been
in the play - the more gestures participated in the playing out of the reception at first - the better will
this past impression be expressed subsequently and the more efficiently will the stored facts be released,
for memories are not ideas, much less images built into us, but gestures involving the whole of the
human compound.").
83. Connerton, 1989: 72 ("Our bodies keep the past in an entirely effective form in their ability to
perform certain skilled actions.... [M]emory is sedimented, or amasses in the body ... ").
84. Pollock et al., 1898: 87. See generally Morinis, 1985: 166 ("Intense pain can produce a 'peak
experience' in the individual which has the potential to make a fundamental mark on the consciousness."). The mnemonic value of pain may also have supported the ancient and medieval practice of
sealing agreements with a hand-slap as opposed to a handshake. See Hibbitts, 1992: 931-32.
85. Birdwhistell, 1970: 13 ("[W]e perceive in pattern and we remember in pattern. Only in this way
are we able to incorporate our society's way of viewing and testing the universe.").
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of land ownership or washing one's hands to dissolve a contract therefore
helps to plant the memory of legal events and transactions firmly in the
minds of witnesses. Simplicity and comprehensibility are especially
critical for memory when witnesses are children. In the Middle Ages,
children were considered useful witnesses to legal transactions because of
their expected long life-spans relative to other members of the community.
Most children, however, had but a limited command of complex verbal
language; they were much more likely to understand, and hence remember,
relatively straightforward gestures. 6
G. Regulatory Functions
Legal gesture can regulate the behavior of individuals. In other words,
it can encourage or discourage certain courses of personal conduct.
In the first place, legal gesture can discourage people from entering into
certain types of transactions or relations which are deemed socially
undesirable." Because legal gestures are necessarily public, they expose
people and their behaviors to the view and judgment of a potentially large
number of others. The very prospect of this public exposure, and the fact
that a legal gesture physically, intimately, and inevitably associates one
with a legal change or relation (contrast this with the physical and
psychological distance which writing sets between contract and contractor;
grant and grantor, etc.) may discourage individuals from entering into
transactions which would lead to social stigma or criticism. In this
context, legal gesture can be a subtle force for social conformity. Legal
gesture can also contribute to conformity insofar as it is explicitly dialogic
- i.e., insofar as it not only requires the presence, but the active
participation of others. The more socially-undesirable a legal change or
relation is, the more difficult it becomes to obtain this active participation,
and hence the more difficult it becomes to either effect the change or
relation and/or preserve it in the mind of the community as a whole.
Legal gesture can perform a second regulatory function by channeling
the physical reactions of parties or witnesses to legal change away from
dangerous acts (such as the commission of violence) which might
otherwise be prompted by the loss (or another's gain) occasioned by some

86. For fear of even their gestural memories failing, medieval children were sometimes struck. An
eleventh century Norman charter thus notes the presence at a transaction of"William, infant, son of Fulk
Moirus, who in account of the memory of this thing received a blow at the altar in the sight of many."

Tabuteau, 1988: 149 (quoting in translation a charter from Saint Pierre de Preaux, dated to between
1078 and 1096).

87. Holmes, 1993: 627 (referring to formalities in general as deterring "socially undesirable
agreements").
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legal change. 88 Historically, a number of legal gestures seem to have
been specially fitted to this role. Under the law of the Salian Franks, for
instance, a person breaking off family ties would break four staffs above
his head and then cast them into the four comers of a room. 89 In early
medieval France, a vassal could analogously disavow his feudal bond by
throwing a stick or straw at his erstwhile lord. 90 These conventional
legal gestures inevitably constrained personal behavior while still giving
vent to volatile personal feelings at critical moments of truth and
confrontation.
Third and finally, legal gesture can increase an individual's incentive to
respect legal change after the fact. It can do this by increasing both the
social benefit attached to compliance and the social cost attached to
breach. When a person takes on an obligation or assumes a relation in the
public and corporeal way mandated by legal gesture, society - as we
have already seen - associates him with the obligation or relation in an
intimate, unavoidably personal way. In the face of such association, a
person's subsequent adherence to his personally-assumed obligation or
promise is likely to give him a positive social reputation (e.g., in honoring
his contract, he brings honor to himself). On the other hand, if a person
breaches a publicly- and personally-assumed obligation, the obvious
discrepancy between his original witnessed behavior and his subsequent
witnessed behavior readily makes him an object of shame in the community (e.g., in disavowing his contract, he necessarily disavows himself). In
this context, legal gesture functions as a social insurance policy of sorts
- undertaking an obligation or relation through gesture may in fact
contribute towards its fulfillment.
H. PsychologicalFunctions
Earlier in this article I described legal gesture as being potentially
evidentiary of a gesturor's mental state (see supra "Evidentiary Functions"). But legal gesture need not be psychologically passive. Indeed,
there is evidence to support the proposition that legal gesture can actually
induce critical psychological changes in both gesturors and witnesses.
To begin, legal gesture helps create or support the perception that a
given legal event is important. As noted previously, gesturing demands
a personal investment of time and energy. Gesturors must show up and

88. In general, "enforced adherence to form. .. is an effectual means of curbing the passions of
[It also] acts as a check upon the premature
the litigants, of preventing tumultuous conduct. ...
tendency to exercise what seems natural justice .. " Engelmann et al., 1928: 174-175.
89. Le Goff, 1980: 268-269.
90. Ibid. at 247. See also the twelfth-century chanson de geste known as Raoul de Cambrai: in this
story, an estranged vassal took "three hairs from the ermine he ha[d] on, pulling them through the links
of his burnished hauberk, and hurled them at Raoul." Kay ed. and trans., 1992: vv. 2121-2135.
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perform; witnesses must show up, watch, and perhaps perform as well. By
sanctioning and requiring such socially inconvenient and sometimes even
physically taxing activities, law implicitly encourages people to think that
an event (such as a marriage, or the making of a will) has unusual
significance for individuals and for the community at large.9
Legal gesture can also overcome what some anthropologists call "sales
resistance" 92 to a legal transaction - the instinctive unwillingness of
persons (usually witnesses or bystanders) to recognize a contract or
relation which is disadvantageous to them, or which gives someone else
an advantage. Legal gesture can accomplish this not-inconsiderable feat
by providing an opportunity for the demonstration of actual or latent
physical and material power. In medieval Europe, for instance, feudal
relationships were doubtless successful in part because of the great
physical and social power present or latent in the various gestures (e.g.,
kneeling, folding and enclosing hands) involved in investiture and homage.
Those gestures necessarily affected the psyche of the witnessing community; they subtlely encouraged its members to respect what had been done,
thereby ensuring the success of feudal law. In this context, legal gesture
in human society may be said to share characteristics generally associated
with gesture in the animal kingdom. 93 There gestures are an efficient
means of, inter alia, establishing relation and showing dominance. 94
Elaborate movements and displays are deployed by mammals and birds to
secure a mate, a nesting area, or other similar advantage. The more
resistance there is or might be to an undertaking because of what is at
stake, the grander, more deliberate, or more elaborate gesturing tends to
be. 95 Such a use of gesture frequently enables resistance to be overcome
without harmful or costly physical struggle.96
In the process of shaping the reaction of witnesses, legal gesture can
also prompt gesturors to feel emotions that directly dispose them towards
a legal exercise's ultimate end. Gesture's general power to induce emotion
in its practitioners has long been recognized by the Catholic Church, and
even by some prominent Protestants. The Catholic Encyclopedia claims
that "ceremony" (which it notably defines as "an external act, gesture or
movement which accompanies ...prayers... and public ... worship")

91. In a broader context, it has been observed that "impressive ceremonies, such as royal
coronations, presidential inaugurations, wedding ceremonies [each of which involves multiple gestures]
...visibly demonstrate the serious nature of certain promises." Holmes, 1993: 626.
92. E.g., Knight, 1993: 6.
93. See generally Kendon, 1992: 182 ("[Mlany human gestures may show analogies with the
displays of animals, which are interpreted by ethologists as ritualizations of acts of withdrawal,
approach, aggression and so on.").
94. See generally Laughlin et al., 1979.
95. See Krebs, 1987: 169 ("By analogy with human advertising, the counterploy to sales resistance
is to increase the sales pitch, to make the signal louder, more repetitive, more conspicuous, in fact to
modify it in any way that will overcome the raised threshold of the reactors.").
96. Knight, 1993: 6.
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is employed "to excite in the faithful sentiments of respect, devotion and
religion., 97 In the sixteenth century, Martin Luther said of religious rites,
"the inward experience follows and is effected by the outward." 98 Law
appears to have taken advantage of this so-called "disciplinary" capacity
of gesture" early on. In the medieval homage ceremony, for instance,
the vassal's gestures of kneeling before the lord and then offering his lips
for the lord to kiss would likely have induced feelings of subordination
appropriate to the success of the new feudal relationship.
Less obviously, but perhaps even more fundamentally, legal gesture can
create a feeling of empowerment in the person who executes it - a
feeling that rather than being controlled by law and legal obligation, an
individual controls those things. This feeling of control is directly induced
by gesture's mode of obligational or relational creation - one performs
a major physical maneuver which directly contributes to making one
legally-bound. The fact that legal gesture is both intensively and
extensively corporeal (i.e., it needs more energy and it usually involves
more of the body than writing) magnifies the sense of control.'00
Through gesture, law literally becomes a part of the person.
III.

RE-MEMBERING LAW

Legal gesture emerges from the foregoing analysis as a powerful and
sophisticated modality which can perform - and historically has
performed - a wide range of indicative, ordinative, evidentiary,
demonstrative, mnemonic, communal, regulatory, and psychological
functions. If gesture is so powerful and so sophisticated, however, why
has it all but vanished from the contemporary legal scene? In a
writing-oriented society, our instinctive answer to this question is,
"Because writing, as a legal instrumentality, is superior."
How is writing superior to gesture as a legal instrumentality? Writing
is generally said to possess three critical strengths: precision, permanence,
and independence from physical co-presence. Writing is a precise medium
because its meaning can be almost infinitely refined through various
permutations and combinations of thousands of written words. This
precision, when applied to law, allows for the creation of highly sophisticated agreements and relations. Writing is also permanent, surviving
exactly and in toto long after a contract is made, or a conveyance is done.

97. 3 Catholic Encyclopedia, 1908: 538.
98.
99.

Quoted in Eire, 1986: 72.
See Schmitt, 1989: 130.

100. In a somewhat-analogous context, it has been suggested that "[t]he physicality of gesture...
has a value in itself.... Compare conducting music with textually specifying tempo changes and
emphasis. The physicality of the interaction contributes to the ... satisfaction of the conductor."
Kurtenbach et al., 1990: 312.

[VOL. 6:51

Making Motions
In law, this means that the terms of obligation or relation can endure
unchanged and unaltered by failures of human memory. Finally, writing
is meaningful in itself, altogether apart from the physical co-presence of
the writer with any given reader. This enables writing to exert power
across time and over long distances. In law, the independence of writing
from physical co-presence permits contracts and agreements to be made
between people located very far apart (e.g., in different cities or different
countries) who cannot, and indeed may never, meet.
Our focus on these strengths of writing has, however, arguably
distracted us from writing's weaknesses. In the first place, writing is no
good at showing people the effect of their legal agreements or relations.
It can describe those agreements and relations, and it can describe their
consequences, but it cannot depict them (and still remain writing). To the
extent that understanding may be better served by concrete depiction rather
than abstract description, writing may be more likely to permit misunderstanding of a legal change or event. In the second place, writing is
relatively ineffective at creating community. Of course writing can put
people from different places and from different times in metaphoric touch
with one another, and certain culturally-key writings (such as the Bible
and the Constitution) can serve as the foundations for so-called "textual
communities,"' 0 ' but writing neither requires nor encourages people to
meet or otherwise encounter each other (for, say, the purpose of concluding or witnessing a legal transaction). In the third place, writing is
arguably not very good at giving individuals a sense of personal empowerment over law. Writing actually disempowers persons who cannot read
and write or are uncomfortable with reading and writing. Even for the
most literate members of a society, writing literally holds the law at arms
length from the body, preventing it from being fully incorporated into
fundamental personal experience.
But these weaknesses of writing are the very strengths of gesture. As
we have seen, legal gesture demonstrates legal meaning and thereby
promotes informed choice and consent. It creates inclusive communities
in space and in time. It is an intimate, inevitably corporeal medium that
gives ordinary individuals a sense that they literally make the law, that it
is truly theirs.
Perhaps one reason (apart from overplayed "tradition") why gesture
survives on the margins of modem law is because, even in the face of
writing, these and other capacities of gesture are still important to us.
Perhaps we shake hands on a contract because we need to create and to
publicly manifest a solidarity with another person that transcends words.
Perhaps, in marriage, we exchange wedding rings and clasp hands in order
to express and release emotions necessarily incidental to (and indeed

101.
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supportive of) the occasion. Perhaps we manually hand over deeds to
complete a conveyance so that we may, in an intimate, bodily sense, share
in and endorse the transfer of a primary form of wealth - or perhaps,
when the stakes are so high, we feel the need to demonstrate our intent to
transfer in the most overt and unambiguous way.
Recognizing that gesture is not inherently inferior to writing, but rather
that it has different functional strengths, may give us a new perspective on
its role in the legal past as well as in the legal present. In the late
classical world and again in the early modem period, gesture arguably
gave way to writing as a legal instrumentality not because it was
"primitive," but because it performed functions that society no longer
valued as much as it once had.'0 2 For instance, as a modality, legal
gesture supports community, but this was surely less significant in
Hellenistic and post-medieval European civilizations which put a greater
emphasis on individualism and privacy. Legal gesture makes legal
transactions memorable, but memorability was less critical in late ancient
and early modem cultures that could readily preserve even the most
unmemorable transactions on parchment or paper. Legal gesture performs
several regulatory functions, but these were seemingly superfluous in
societies which by the first century B.C. and the sixteenth century
A.D."°3 had generated centralized state structures commanding powerful
physical sanctions and deterrents. Legal gesture deliberately harnesses the
mind to the body, but such harnessing was problematic in a Europe which
first learned to distrust the body under the tutelage of early Christian
asceticism, and then in the seventeenth century segregated and further
denigrated it under the influence of formal Cartesian philosophy. In these
environments, legal gesture could be, and was, readily marginalized.
This analysis of legal gesture's place in the past has definite implications for its place in the future. There are many indications that "modemism" is collapsing - that we are turning away from the individualist,
abstract, and ethereal (some would say generally "alienating") values of
the post-Enlightenment era. There is a new longing for community,
concreteness, and embodiment. In this context, writing's weaknesses as
a legal instrumentality are becoming more manifest, even (or perhaps
especially) as an increasing number of legal scholars use writing to
directly and indirectly plead for the new normative agenda. By the same
token, gesture's strengths are becoming increasingly important and
relevant, all the more so because video and computer technology has lately
intervened in favor of gesture by making it readily recordable, transmissible, and (in virtual reality) simulable. As a result, gesture, like writing,

102. This is not to suggest, however, that society's embrace of new values or its development of
new capacities in these historical contexts was completely unrelated to -the spread of writing. See
generally Katsh, 1989; Olson, 1994; Ong, 1982.
103. See Meyer, 1988; Eire, 1986; Bremmer et al., 1991.
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potentially permanent and independent of physical co-preshas become
04
ence.1
Ideologically and technologically, therefore, legal gesture stands ready
for a revival. Here I am not suggesting that it will (or that it should)
replace writing as a legal instrumentality. I am simply saying that given
our changing cultural priorities and our new technical abilities it may
prove useful and convenient for us to supplement our everyday legal
transactions (the making of contracts, the making of wills, the transfer of
land, etc.) with more legal gestures, and to make more legally binding the
gestures that now informally supplement and evidence written law -just
as, in later antiquity and in the late Middle Ages, it proved culturally
useful and technically convenient to supplement legal gesture with more
legal writing and to make more legally binding the writing that then
supplemented and evidenced legal performances. 0 5 In light of what I
have said in this Article, I do not think that the former development
should necessarily be feared. 106 Indeed, I think we should consider
using legal gesture pro-actively to create a more communal, more concrete,
more corporeal, and ultimately more compelling legal future for ourselves.0 7 In the end, we may find that one of the best ways to reform
law is to re-member it.

104. It might be argued that by allowing gestural communication to take place outside of a literal
face-to-face environment, these developments potentially reduce legal gesture's capacity to create
community. While this may be true (indicating, inter alia, that the new technology is hardly a social
or legal panacea, and may even create new problems by complicating the relationship between the
"perceived" and the "real"), it may still be said that even recorded, transmitted, or (in virtual reality)
electronically-simulated gestures performed by individuals before electronically-present witnesses induce
feelings of communal participation and accountability more readily than does writing (recall, for
instance, the tendency of the contemporary television audience to instinctively relate to - i.e.,
experience "community" with - an embodied television personality or character despite the absence
of any direct physical contact).
105. This does not mean that the legal gestures of the future will necessarily be the same as the
legal gestures of the past. In decades to come, technologies such as virtual reality may in fact enable
us to perform legal gestures in a computer-generated, mutually-inclusive cyberspace that would have
been physically impossible and perhaps even inconceivable in a "live" environment. If anything, this
should make legal gesture more versatile than ever. For a brief discussion of the revolutionary
implications of virtual reality for the future of law (and, potentially, of legal gesture), see Pruitt et al.,
1991: 405 ("Jargon-loaded and abstract documents will transform, becoming dynamic actors in
cyberspace. For example, contracts will be a composite cyberspace object that the reader can step
inside of and in which he can visit precise interactive objects that simulate the product or service that
is being contracted").
106. Lepow, 1992: 123 ("Historically, our society fears visual [i.e. imagistic/gestural] expression.").
107. Recalling the role of the original Reformation in marginalizing gesture in favor of writing (see
Eire, 1986; Bremmer et al. eds., 1991), what I am proposing here is something of a legal
Counter-Reformation that might eventually restore the body to a more central position in law's text.
Realistically, however, I hardly expect this proposal to be enthusiastically embraced by contemporary
legal scholars who are wary even of placing greater formal reliance on oral speech which, as language,
is more directly elaborative of (and hence less challenging to) the written word than is gesture. On this
latter wariness, see, e.g., Collins et al., 1990: 1119: "[W]e find it curious that the new critics of legal
studies devote such great attention to the interpretation of texts. Although purporting to represent [in
writing] the cause of the 'new voices' or 'other voices' they seem deaf to the oral. Put differently, is
not the real problem ...
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more one of ...

format than ... content?"
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